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INTRODUCTION
The question of the nature and meaning of history has
become increasingly important in contemporary thought.

In

theological circles, it has become the central theme of discussion.

There are a number of reasons why this is so.

The

events of the times in which we live have brought about a
definite rejection of any knowledge-equals-progress idea of
history as well as a call for interpretation of the profound
social crises which we confront.

The widespread influence of

existentialism, with its emphasis on relativism and subjectivism, has brought into question not only the nature of history, in terms of present reality, but alsothe validity of
the historians• pursuits.
For the Christian theologian, the development of higher
criticism of the Scriptures has brought the question more to
the fore.

Literary and historical criticism led the scholars

of fifty years ago either to an emphasis on the ethical teachings of Jesus or to a search for the historical Jesus.

More

recently, form criticism, particularly in the hands of
Rudolf Bultmann, has res ulted in a shadowing of the occurrences
of the past and an emphasis on the events of faith.

Inasmuch

as Christianity has traditionally claimed to be an historical
religion grounded in such events as the Incarnation, the Crucifixion and the Resurrection, all of which happened in time
but which also involve the dimension of the eternal, the

2

que s t i on of history looms as a cri t ica l on e.

Such ideas a s

the Ki ngdom of God, redemption , l i fe after death, and the
purpose f ul Will of God carry within them much concerning the
nat ure and meaning of history, but even more important than
these is the fact of the historical basis of the Christian
faith.
As a result of this increased interest, a multitude of
books and articles have been written in the last twenty-five
years, and particularly during the last ten , on the subject
of history and, since the question still rema i ns an open
one, more can be expected.

Chr i s tian historians such as

Herbert Butterfield, Arnold Toynbee, and Karl LBwith have
brought real insight to the question and have attempted to
see some patterns of meaning in history from the perspective
of faith.

Others have been led to the question of history

by more indirect paths, but have had tremendous influence on
the discussion.

Such is the case with the two men whose

thought will be our primary consideration; Rudolf Bultmann
and Reinhold Niebuhr.

Ne ither is an historian, as such, but

both have muph to say about history.
Born in 1884 and educated in Germany, Rudolf Bultmann
served on the faculties of several universities before accepting a professorship at the University of Marsburg in 1921.
There he remained until 1951 when he became professor emeritus.
It is as a New Testament scholar that Rudolf Bultmann reaches
the question of history.
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Like Schleiermacher, Bultmann has seen his task to be
that of addressing the modern man and making the Christian
Gospel intelligent and relevant to the mind and to the needs
of such a man.

His perspective is from a philosophical under-

standing of man that reflects considerable dependence on
Heidegger, the existentialist, but his primary concern is
man's relationship to God.

In this light, he attempts to

use the best tooks of modern science and philosophical thought,
as well as his expert skills as a Biblical scholar and critic.
In 1941, he delivered a lecture which was later published
under the title "the New Testament and Mythology."

Brief

though this lecture is, it brought about tremendous controversy from various Protestant theological positions.

Because

of his emphasis on the eschatological nature of the Christevent and bis insistence that the Christ of faith be proclaimed with little or not concern for the historical Jesus
or his moral teachings, theological liberalism, particularly
the Life Qf. Jesus School which preceded him, reacted by labeling
him a radical, as did those who stood within the School of
the History of Religions.

On the otherhand, conservatives,

some who rejected all Biblical critical study and others who
accepted it within limits, were aghast at Bultmann's claim
that the New Testament was filled with myths and must therefore be demythologized in order to be intelligible to modern
man.

The debates which followed were many.

During the early

portions of these "vigorous conversations," discussion of his
idea of demythologizing was central, but it was not long before most scholars realized that the question of the nature
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and meaning of history lay at the base of all of their discussions.

It is primarily in this area that the Bultmann

debates have continued.
Unlike Bultmann, Reinhold Niebuhr arrives at the
question of history from the paths of a parish minister and
a professor of Christian ethics.

Born in Wright City, Miss-

ouri in 1892, the son of a German Evangelical minister,
Niebuhr attended college and seminary in the Mid-West and
received his Bachelor of Divinity and Master of Arts degrees
from Yale.

Upon graduating, he became minister in a newly-

organize d parish in Detroit at the time when that Michigan
city was rapidly becoming the automobile capital of the world
and one of the chief industrial centers of the nation.

It

was during his thirteen-year ministry in this parish that he
became vividly aware of the irrelevancy of the moralistic
idealism which his liberal theology made tantamount to the
Christian faith.

The crises of personal lives and the social

ills of an expanding technical society, not to mention t h e
tragic events of World War I, crowded up around him, forcing
him to a rejection of the unrealistic optimism of liberalism
and to deep and searching questions about the nature of the
Gospel and its meaning for the everyday lives of people.
In 1928, he became professor of Christian Ethics at
Union Theological Seminary.

It was here that he began to

clarify this thoughts and formulate his ideas concerning the
relationship of the Christian Gospel to the life of men in
their personal and social lives.

This led him quickly to
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the basic question of the nature and meaning of history.

As

early as 1932, he dealt specifically with the Christian interpretation of history in a book entitled

~ezond

Tragedy, but

it was in his published Gifford lectures of 1941 and 1942,
~

Nature and Destiny .QA.

treatment.

~'

that the subject received full

An elaboration of these ideas was published in

1949 under the title

Faith~

History.

Niebuhr, like Bultmann and perhaps all theologians,
has his share of critics , but it must be admitted that his
works have brought about.fir less controversy than have
Bultmann's .

Those of the liberal persuasion, both secular

and Christian, have been among his most vocal critics, attacking him mainly at three points:

(1) what they consider

his preoccupation with the negative aspects of man's nature,
t hat is man's basic sinfulness; (2) his denial of any idea
of the perfectability of man and therefore of the inevitable
progress of history; and {3) his criticism of liberal culture
from an admittedly Christian perspective (obviously, "scientific" inquiry can never go to empirical evidence holding
presuppositions, particularly religious onesl) . From other
critics of the Barthian persuasion came words of concern
about his relationship of faith to reason .

Niebuhr has res-

ponded to some of these criticisms in later writings, pa rticularly

!!Ut

~ ~

the Dramas .Q.f History, published in 1955.

Beginning from the point of Christian ethics and giving
considerable attention to the nature of man,

Niebuhr develops

his concept of history quite diffe r ently from Bultmann.

It

will be the task of this paper to examine the idea of history
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in the thought of each of these men and then , thr ough a critiqu e and comparison , evaluate each in terms of their
strengths and weaknesses as well as their similarities and
differences.

CHAPTER
RUDOLF BULTMANN:

~

CONCEPT OF HISTORY

The meani n g of history lies always in the present,
and when the present is conceived as the eschatological present by Christian faith the meaning of
history is realized. Man who complains: 11 1 cannot
see meaning in history, and t herefore my l ife,
interwoven in history, is meaningless," is to be
admonished: do not look around yourself into
universal history, you must look into your o~m
personal history. Always in your present lies
the meaning in history, and you cannot see it
as a spectator, but only in your responsible
decisions. In every moment slumbers the possibility of being the eschatological moment. You
must awaken it.1
With the above s tatement, Rudolf Bultmann concluded
his Gifford Lectures in 1955 on the subject "History and Eschatology.

11

Until these lectures, this German theologian had

said very little about the subject of history directly, thou gh
implicitly he had said a great deal.

As we have noted earlier,

his writings stem from his work as a New Testament scholar and
deal primarily with that aspect of form-criticism known as
demythologizing.

At the core of all of his writings, however,

lies his understanding of the nature and meaning of history.
Indeed, it has been to these c oncepts, that many of his
critics have aimed their heaviest blows.

The result has been

one of the most active theological struggles of this century.
1Rudolf Bultmann, Histo:y and Eschatology (Edinburgh:
The University Press, 1957), p. 155.
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Bultmann ' s c oncept of history and its meaning is intimately tied up with t he presuppositions which he makes fo r
historical study .

This is true to the extent that aay dis-

cussion of one includes the other and thus our presentation
will, in effect , jump from one t o t he other, though making
some attempt to list his presuppositions.
Let us begin , however,
his understanding of history.
hist ory of mind.

w~th

one statement regarding

"His tory is understood as the

But mind is not realized otherwis e than in

human thoughts, and human t houghts are ultimately intentions
of individuals.

The subject of history is therefore humanity

within the i ndividual human persons; therefore it may be said:
2
the subject of history is man."
We will return to this later
for further discussion, but, keeping this i n mind, let us now
consider some presuppositions which Bultmann makes for historical study.
First, it is presupposed that the hi storian will not
approach his tas k for the purpose of supporting con clusions
which he has already drawn.

Such prejudice will not allow

his rese arch to speak freely to him, and in fact, will render
his work of questionable value even before he begins.
Secondly, it is presupposed that the historical method
of research will be employed and will make use of all availabl e scientific data in approaching the material.

In studying

written works, for exampl e, the rules of grammar, the meaning
of words, the individual style, the language of the time, as
2 I b1d., p. 143.

-
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well as the historical setting, must be given appropriate
attention and understanding.

This is no less true with

Biblical exegesis than with other literature.
A third presupposition is that "history is a unity in
the sense of a closed continuum of effects in which individual
events are connected by the succession of cause and effect. 11 3
This does not mean that the process of history does not include free decisions of men whose actions affect historical
happenings, but it does mean that even these decisions are
not without causes and motives.

It is the historian's task

to come to know the causes and the motives of actions and
events and thus to understand the whole historical movement
as a closed unity.

An implication which is obvious in such

a presupposition is that there can be no intervening supernatural powers, no effects without causes, no miracles for
which there are no causes which lie within history.

As a

science, historical research cannot perceive of such an
occurrence and, should it find. one, must discount the act or
event as without historical reality.
It is also presupposed that within the continuum,
historical phenomena are many-sided and complex.

The French

Revolution, for example, may be viewed in economic or political terms, in religious or social terms, etc.

Historians

will vary in their assessment of these forces and will, in
fact, be guided by some particular point of view.

His inter-

pretation may be from an aesthetic interest, a psychological
3Rudolf Bultmann, 11 Is Exegesis Without Presuppositions
Possible?'', Encounter, vol. 21, no. 2, Spring, 1960, p. 196.
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interest, a political interest, or what-have-you, but he will
mandatorily have some specific way of raising questions and
interpreting data.

This implies that the historian must have

certain understandings of his particular interest in the matter
being studied.

That is, to approach a certain matter from

the aesthetic interest requires, for example, that the historian must have knowledge of art, its technique and essence,
etc.

Or if the interest is psychological, the historical

scholar must have knowledge of psychical phenomena.
calls this

11

Bultmann

pre-understanding 11 and sees it as an unavoidable

and necessary presupposition to historical study.
A fifth presupposition grows out of this to say that
the historian must stand in a life relatiam to the subject
matter.

Specifically, this means that only he who lives in

a state and in a society can comprehend the social and political phenomena both of the past and the present.

And only he

who has a life-relation to music can understand research material that deals with music.

Generally, it may also be seen

to mean that only he who recognizes himself as standing
within history and taking part in it can adequately approach
historical research.

This "existential encounter" with his-

tory causes the historian to participate excitedly in history
and in his study and thus to be able to hear the claims of
history.
Because this is so, a sixth presupposition arises to
require that there always be an open-endedness to historical
study that recognizes the importance
ual historical research.

ct'

continued and contin-

With the claim which historical

ll
phenomena make both upon the "now" and upon the historian
the study must never be closed, but reviewed, evaluated and
renewed in every generation.
The question that immediately aTises from all of these
presuppositions is whether objectivity ln the knowledge and
interpretation of historical phenomena is a.t all attainable.
Indeed, historical research can establish as fixed and objective certain items within the historical process:

dates,

locality, etc.; those occurrences which happened in a certain
place and at a certain time.

But history cannot be seen as

limited to such chronologically and geographically determinable events and actions.

History is really concerned with

the interpretation, the meaning and the significance of events
and actions and these cannot be established objectively in the
sense of absolute ultimate knowledge nor in the sense of
purity.

Because of the historian's viewpoint, because of his

existential encounter with history, because the historical
phenomena speak to the historian in the present, the subjectivity of the historian is involved.

In terms of his view-

point and pre-understanding, it is j'.l.st the recognition of
this that gives his research objectivity.

Only if he makes

his viewpoint absolute, is his research subjective.

In terms

of his life relation, however,
• • • the demand that the interpreter must silence
his subjectivity and extinguish his individuality,
in order to attain to an objective knowledge is,
therefore, the most absurd one that can be
imagined. • • • The most subjective interpretation
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is in this case the •most objective,' that is,
only those who are stirred by the question of
their own existence can hear the claim which
history makes.4
In his introduction to Jesus and the Word, Bultmann
deals with this matter of subjectivity by pointing out that
man cannot observe history in the same way in which he observes nature because of his essential involvement.

Thus,

every time man says something about history, he is saying
something about himself.

He can encounter history only as

he enters into dialogue with it and he can hear its demands
only as he comes seeking answers to the questions of his own
existence.

This does not end in complete relativism if the

observer is willing to place even the subjectivity of his
position under his interrogation of history and is willing
to listen to history as an authority.

This is the point at

which there may be found an objective element which is really
present in history.5
Returning to our earlier reference to Bultmann's
understanding of history as man, we can now go further in
discussing what is the meaning of history.

The core and

subject of history is man and the concern of history is,
therefore, the field of human actions.

It is Bultmann's

contention that human actions are caused l2iL their purposes
and their intentions and that, therefore, human life is
4Rudolf Bultmann, Essays (New York:
Company, 1955), pp. 255-56.

The MacMillan

5Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus and the Word (New York:
Cl'm'les Scribner's Sons, 1934), PP· 3-15.
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always future directed.

Man is always "on the way" and each

moment contains within it not only the past but also the
future.
All that man does and undertakes in his present
becomes revealed only in the future as important
or vain, as fulfillment or failure.6
·
Every present situation grows out of the past and yet, because
it is also a situation of decision which concerns the future,
it contains both the past and the future.
The relativity of each present moment, rightly
seen by historicism, is therefore not relativity
in the sense in which any particular point within
a causal series is a relative one, but has the
positive sense that the present is the moment of
decision, and by the decision taken the yield of
the past is gathered in and the meaning of the
future is chosen.7
This leads Bultmann to the second of his ma.ior conclusions
regarding the meaning of history (the first being that history is the history of man) and that is that the relativity
of every historical situation is understood as having a positive meaning.
Christianity and History
Because Bultmann's concept of history is so entwined
with his understanding of the meaning of the Christian faith,
we turn now to a discussion of Christianity and history.
Throughout all of his writings in this area, there are many
implications concerning his concept of history though they
are rather difficult to determine at points, particularly in
any organized way.
6Bultmann, History and Eschatology, p. 140.
7Ibid., p. 141.
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Perhaps the best place to begin is with Bultmann's
distinction of myth, historisch (objective-historical), and
geschichtlich (existential-historical).

Bultmann sees these

three elements as evident in the New Testament and in the
early Church.
The term "myth" has been used with great frequency in
recent theological conversations, often with variant meaning.
According to Bultmann's formal definition, myth is a way of
expressing "the other worldly in terms of this world and the
divinein terms of human life, the other side in terms of this
side.118

By the way in which he employs the terms, however,

he appears to broaden the definition to include the expression
of a world-view which is untenable to modern man.

Perhaps the

two may be seen as one in the light of what he sees the purpose of myth to be:

"The real purpose of myth is not to pre-

sent an objective picture of the world as it is, but to express man's understanding of himself in the world in which
he lives. 11 9

To this end, then, while it may appear that man

is describing his world, he actually is describing his own
existence.

Any primitive cosmology which proclaims the exis-

tence of demons, for example, would not so much describe the
objective world as it would man's realization that his life
has limitations which are beyond his control.
It is Bultmann's position that in the New Testament the
Christian Gospel is couched in a first-century world-view and
8Rudolf Bultmann, et al, Kerygma ~ Myth: A Theological Debate (Londnn: SPCK, 1953), footnote 2, p. 10. (The
ensuing analysis of Bultmann's treatment of myth is based. primarily on this essay.)
9rbid., p. lo.
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in the mythology of Jewish apocalyptic and the Gnostic myths
of redemption.

To get at the core of the Gospel, which is for

all time and all people, and make it intelligible to modern
man. the New Testament must be demythologized and the kerygma
laid bare.

Veiled in all of its mythological finery, it is

not apt to lead man to decide for God.
In laying his foundations for demythologizing the New
Testament, Bultmann cites a number of aspects of this mythological framework which are totally unacceptable to ·modern
man.

Obviously, the Babylonian cosmology of a three-story

universe which places a flat earth in the center with heaven
upstairs and hell in the basement is a world view which is
impossible for any modern man seriously to hold.

Belief in

spirits, whether good or bad, as well as belief in miracles
are contradictory to what we now know about the forces and
laws of nature and natural causation as well as to man's
understanding of himself as a rational being and as essentially
a unity.

Any mythological eschatology that includes the par-

ousia of Christ in literal terms, as the New Testament expects,
is further unacceptable.

That death is the punishment of sin

or that a doctrine of atonement that makes one sinless man's
death an expiation of another's guilt could be taken very
seriously by contemporary thought is sheer nonsense.

The

resurrection of Jesus Christ falls under the same objection
as do the virgin birth, the healing miracles, the ascension
of Christ, and His pre-existence.

The kerygma must be stripped

of its mythological framework and re-interpreted into a meaningful message for today.

•
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It should be made clear that in approaching mythology
in the New Testament, Bultmann is not following the Liberal
formula.

Liberalism examined the myth by modern knowledge,

measured it as meaningless, and threw it out of Christianity.
Bultmann, however, sees his task as one of interpreting myth
from the understanding of human existence which the New Testament enshrines.

In other words, the task is to interpret

myth existentially so as to arriTe at the New Testament solutions to the riddle of human life, solutions which, as truth,
are acceptable to the non-mythological mind of today.
Bultmann has been heavily criticized at this point of
demythologizing, not so much because of its value in form
criticism, which is recognized, but because of the danger
involved in the selectivity of what is to be regarded as myth
and in the importance attributed to myth.

Such phrases as

"Lamb of God" are obviously figurative ones, but others cannot be so easily distinguished.

We shall say more about this

later.
The second element which nust be recognized is histor1sch or the objective-historical.

11

H1storisch means an event,

a fact, which took place on a certain date, which can be
verified in our ordinary experience with the aid of the historical method. 1110

The narrative elements of the New Testa-

ment center in the definite historic person of Jesus of
Nazareth and therefore lend themselves to study as objective
10

SOM

L. Malevez, T~ Christian Message and Myth (London:
l?ress, Ltd., 1958T, p. 73.
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happenings by the historian.

Such events a.re those which have

a definite place in world history.
vides a good example:

The passion of Jesus pro-

his betrayal, arrest, trial and cruci-

fixion are determinable by objective scientific study.

They

are not mythical and, apart from interpretation, may be
readily accepted as historical events, in the sense of
torisch.

!!1&-

The question which arises, of course, is whether

these objective-historical events are the concern of theology.
Faith in the cross has an entirely different meaning from a
belief in the cross as a fact of history.

To Bultmann, the

prime concern must be with the content of faith and not mere
historical data.
The third element which Bultmann distinguishes is
termed geschichtlich or the existential-historical, and is of
the greatest importance.

~phichtlich,

like historisch, is

concerned with an event but it is one Which cannot necessarily
be connected with a date or a place, nor proved by historical
evidence.

It is an existential encounter that bespeaks of

the I-thou dimension of life:

an element which makes an

event significant for my existence and possibility and of the
greatest relevance for my life today.

This is particularly

evident in the way in which the Cross is understood.

As we

have noted, the Cross may be viewed as

histor~

the fact of the crucifixion of Jesus.

But in the Christian

which admits

message, the significance of the Cross is lifted to cosmic
dimensions as a ges£g1-£htlich event which affects the whole
of huinanity in its relation to God and through which each man
may find his real self.

Indeed, the existential-historical

18
(gesctlchtlich} fact originated in the objective-historical
(hist2£i~ch»

event of the crucifixion of Jesus, but the ac-

knowledgement of such a death in 30 A.D. and the confession
that this same long-ago death has all-important significance
for me today are two different things.

The significance of

the Cross as geschichtlich transcends the temporal and speaks
to men both then and now.

The distinction of these two terms

is a tremendously important one.

Obviously, Bultmann attri-

butes the greater value to the existential-historical

(~

.[Qhichtlich).
With these three elements in mind, Bultmann goes about
his task of making the Gospel relevant to the contemporary
mind, but he does so against an existential understanding of
faith and eschatology.
If the being of man in the true sense of the term
is to be understood as historical being, which
draws the reality of its experience from encounters,
it is clear on the one hand that faith which speaks
of the act of God which encounters it cannot defend itself against the objection that it is no
more than an illusion - for the encounter with God
is certainly not objective in the sense of being
an event of the natural order; but on the other
hand it is equally clear that faith, being a reality
of encounter on the level of existence, not only
is not under any necessity of refuting this objection,
but cannot in fact attempt to do so1 yithout misunderstanding its own significance.
It is only in faith that one can say that in this or
that. event God acted or that God spoke to me.

In this faith

and in the decisions of faith, it is God himself who encounters
man and in the encounter Christ is transformed into "God for us."
11Giovanni Miegge, Gospel and Myth!!!.~ Thoua~t 2f
Rudolf Bultmann (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1960T, p. 200.
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Bultmann's treatment of falth involves the existentialist view of man and identifies the life of faith as authentic being.
The New Testament addresses man as one who is
through and through a self-assertive rebel who
knows from bitter experience that the life he
actually lives is not his authentic life, and that
he is totally incapable of achieving that life by
his mm efforts. • • • Authentic life becomes
possible only when man is delivered from himself.
• • • At this very point where man can do nothing,
God steps in and acts - \~deed he has acted already - on man's behalf.
By the grace of God man's sins are forgiven, he is released
from the bondage of the past and he is made free for the
future.

This is self-understanding speaking to self-under-

standing.

The response of faith is a receiving of self-hood

as a gift and a deliverance into freedom.

His past is always

present in the state of being forgiven, but his future is open
to obey the Will of God.
The event of Jesus Christ is the revelation of the love
of God which makes man free from himself and free to be himself.

The fact

that the faith which transforms takes place

in necessary association with a figure "who for us cannot be
more than an ideal picture drawn by his followers, or a
theological symbol, does not in the least evacuate the divine
encounter of its reality. 1113

The historian may answer some

questions about Jesus of Nazareth, but faith, being personal
decision, cannot be dependent upon a historian's labor.
12Bultmann, et al, Ker~gI\la ~Myth: ~ Theologic~~
Debate, pp. 30-31.
1

3M1egge, .Qll• ~., P• 89.
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This leads us to the area of eschatology for the decision of faith is, to Bultmann, an eschatological event.

In

his Gifford lectures, Bultmann defined eschatology as "the
doctrine of 'last things' or, more accurately, of the occurrences with which our known world comes to an end. 11 14 He
makes it clear,. however, in a response to J. Schniewind,
that the only true interpretation of eschatology, rather than
be one which lies beyond the bounds of time and space, must
be a real experience of human life. 15 The primary message of
Jesus was an eschatological one - that of the coming of the
reign of God - but it must be understood in unity with his
ethical teachings.

As such, Bultmann contends, the fulfill-

ment of God's will is the condition for participation in the
salvation of God's reign and that requires man's decision
for God now, in the concrete moment as he confronts his
neighbor.

As he so responds in faith, man participates in

the eschatological.

Eschatology involves this moment of en-

counter, crisis and decision, a passage from anxiety to faith,
from inauthentic to authentic being.
The real historicity of the Ohristian life bevomes apparent from the fact that his life is a
continuous being on the w;?' between the 'no
Longer• and the 'not yet.
The man in faith is no longer who he was for he is in a world
not of the flesh and this is the eschatological.

The paradox

14Bultmann, History and Eschatology, p. 23.
15Bul tmann, et al, Kerm~ !Ylll M;zth • • • , P• 106.
16Bultmann, Historl and E~cha~ologz, p. 46.

-
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is that he is, at the same time, not yet.

He must still become

what he already is and yet he already is what he shall become.
It was in this "time-between" that the early Christians found
themselves in light of their belief in the impending coming
of the end of the world.

But it is also the situation of the

contemporary Christian whose faith is built upon the

geschi~h

tlich which, in essence, is eschatological.
As we have progressed, some idea of the way in which
Bultmann employs these concepts has been obvious.

It will be

well, however, to go back and spell this out a little more
clearly.

We may begin by observing that Bultmann approaches

his task of demythologizing the New Testament with a heavy
hand and a well-sharpened pencil.

Because of his concern to

get at the basic kerygma, he eliminates most of the events of
the Synoptic Gospels as being highly mythical and therefore
unreliable.

Of greater importance, however, is his claim

that even if the records of the historical Jesus were more
historically accurate and extensive, they would still be of
little value since, as historisch, they could not lead to an
encounter with the Christ of faith.

The objective-historical

has only theoretical interest for historical research.

Other-

wise, it is of little importance.
We have already noted that the event of the Cross is
seen to be an objective-historical (historisch) event, but
more importantly, an existential-historical (geschichtlich)
fact.

Even here, however, demythologizing must be done to

remove the untenable views of sacrifice. and blood atonement
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as well as those of a pre-existent Son to whom death would be
meaningless.

The Cross is thus the existential-historical

event through which God spoke and still speaks his word of
forgiveness.

It was not an event of objective reconciliation.

All that can be said is that through it God was able to pronounce his word of pardon and that whenever it is preached
anew it encounters man with God's love.
The resurrection, on the other hand, must be immediately
declared as myth, on the grounds of Bultmann's presuppositions
and his analysis of modern man.
Nothing preceding the faith which acknowledges
the risen Christ can give insight into the
reality of Christ's resurrection. The resurrection
cannot • • • be demonstrated or made plausible as
an objectively ascertainable fact on the basis of
which one could believe. But insofar as it or the
risen Christ is presented in the proclaiming word,
it can be believed - and only so can it be believed. 17
After considering the historical evidence, then, Bultmann
throws out the resurrection as myth, and establishes its
reality as existing in the proclamation of the Word.

Because

He is present in a way different from the presence of any
other historical person, His presence - His resurrection is an eschatological event.
tion must be connected to

Because, however, the resurrec-

~

objective-historical event,

Bultmann attaches it to the event of the Cross and sees them
as a unity.

To believe in the resurrection is to believe in

the saving efficacy of the Cross of Christ.

Together, they

7Rudolf Bultmann, Theol~gt .Q.f. ~ lifil!. Testament
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951), Vol. I, p. 305.
1
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are proclaimed.

"Christ meets us in the preaching as one

crucified and risen.
nowhere else.

He meets us in the word of preaching and

The faith of Easter is just this - faith in the

word of preaching." 18
Bultmann gives similar treatment to other aspects of
his Biblical study including interpretation of the Old Testament.

In his essay on ":Prophecy and Fulfillment," he gives

particular attention to the covenant concept, the concept of
the Kingdom of God, and the concept of the people of God and
he interprets them in their eschatological dimension.19
Realizing that the New Testament was written in light of the
Easter faith, he sees the understanding of Jesus as Lord and
Saviour and as the decisive eschatological event, as one
which gradually developed in the early Ohurch.

The whole

concept of vicarious sacrifice developed in the Church, as
did the concept of Jesus as Messiah and as Judge, and the concepts of the resurrection and the Incarnation.

Bultmann, in

fact, presents an evolutionary outline of the development of
a Ohristology and does so against the background of the early
Church which became both Jewish and Greek and which had to
adjust to its existence as both an historical phenomenon as
well as an eschatological event.

That development may be

sketched, as it finds New Testament expression, as follows:
( 1)

The germ-cell is the kerygma of the death
and resurrection of Jesus

18Bultmann, et al, !f_erygpia and. }'I;x:th • • • , p. 41.
19Bultmann, Essays, PP• 191-206.
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(2)

( 3)

(4)
(5)
(6)

(?)

The brief kerygma of the passion and Easter
required fuller visualization, • • • and
assignment of a place in the divine plan of
salvation; • • • {thus) the account of the
Baptist and the proofs of fulfilled predict ions.
The Christian 11 sacraments 11 had to be accounted
for in the life of Jesus.
A visualization of what Jesus had done • • •
Hence the collection of miracle-stories.
Probably the apophthegms also stood in the
service of this visualization.
The reason that sayings of the Lord11 • • • came
more and more to be taken up into the gospel"
is that, while missionary preaching continued,
preaching to Christian congregations took on
ever increasing importance.
Finally both the moral exhortation and the
regulations of the Congregation had to be
accounted for 1n the life and words of Jesus.
Hence, • • • /the~/ were also taken up into
"the gospel. u'2'0
This growth from the simple to the complex is seen by

Bultmann to be based not on objective-historical data but on
what the Church came ,t.Q. believe about Jesus.

In doing so,

the germ-cell of the Gospel was clouded while at the saem
time being made more relevant to the needs of the early
Church.
It is Bultmann's point that the Gospel be seen in its
core to be the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.

To do

so requires demythologizing, but.also recognizing that faith
rests not on h..1storisch but on geschichtlich.

The kerygma

comes to contemporary man as an act of God demanding complete
surrender and at the same time offering authentic being.
This is an act of divine revelation and Christ lives again in
its proclamation.

It 1s this miracle or revelation and its

response, whether in faith or in re,jection, that makes it an
20Bultmann, 1heology of the New Testament, Vol. I,
p. 86.
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eschatological event.
We began our discussion of Bultmann's concept of history with a quotation from his Gifford lectures.

In the light

of all that has been said, it may be well to repeat it now:
The meaning of history lies always in the present,
and when the present is conceived as the eschatological present by Christian faith the meaning
of history is realized. Man who complains: 'I
cannot see meaning in history, and therefore my
life, interwoven in history, is meaningless,' is to
be admonished: do not look around yourself into
universal history, you must look into your own
personal history. Always in your present lies
the meaning in history, and you cannot see it as
a spectator, but only in your responsible decisions.
In every moment slumbers the possibility of being
the eschatological moment. You must awaken it.2T
We understand Bultmann to be saying, primarily, three
things.

First, no one can expect to see any meaning in what

might be called universal history, that is, some general
pattern or purpose into which observable events may be fitted.
God's purposes are known and worlced out by Him, but they are
indiscernible to man.
.ar~.

Christians believe that His purposes

being worked out, but how the goals are being achieved

is known to Him alone.
Secondly, the meaning of history lies within each man's
own existence in the present moment.

As man, called by Christ

to authentic being, stands in the eternal present, forgiven
of his sins and open to the will of God in his future, the
esohatological moment becomes real.

In the responsible deci-

sions of that moment can the meaning of history be realized.
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Thirdly, history must be seen to stand in an existential .relationship with man.

That is to say, man cannot

be viewed as the subject and history as the object, or even
the reverse.

Man is in history from his origin and within

it has his existence.

History must be approached from the

inside and not from the outside.

Difficult as these thought

patterns may be, Bultmann seems to be grounding his understanding of history in the nature of human existence.

As

such, man is called to be himself in authentic being and
the essential nature and meaning of history must be interpreted in these terms.

CHAPTER II
REINHOLD NIEBUHR:

CONCEPT OF HISTORY

As minister of a Detroit church and as professor of
Christian ethics at Union Theological Seminary, Reinhold
Niebuhr has somehow found the time to write a great many books
and a tremendous number of articles for both secular and religious periodicals.
twofold.

His motivations for such writings are

To preach the Gospel in such a way that it will be

credible to modern man is, of course, primary.
books are written particularly toward this end.

His major
The second

motive deals with the application of the principles of Christianity to every day living.
titled Leaves !f.2!!!

In his early publication en-

~Notebook of~

Tamed Cynic, he observed

that "the average man always accepts the gospel 'in principle,'
and then proceeds to emasculate it by a thousand reservations."
Often the application is either ignored or presented with lack
of clarity.

Convinced that the Gospel must be brought to

bear upon contemporary issues, regardless of how controversial
they might be, Niebuhr has written innumerable articles on a
variety of social and political issues and, in several of his
books, has critically analyzed the American scene from the
Christian perspective.

There can be little doubt that he is

the outstanding American theologian of our day, regardless
1Reinhold Niebuhr, Leaves from the Notebook of a Tamed
Cynic (New York: Willett, Clark,-ancf Colby, i929),-,P.-l~-
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of the fact that he claims, with humility, not even to be
a theologian.
Throughout all of his writings has run a persistent
interest in the nature and meanillg of history.

Because of

his insistence that man must see meaning in his life, this
would obviously be so. The precise structure of his concept
of history, however, is not quite so obvious.

Our approach

will be to attempt to get at the bases of his thought and to
understand his primary emphases.
In order to comprehend Niebuhr, one must first recognize
the fact that he is a believer, to the first degree, in the
reality of polarities in life which are incapable of synthesis.
These are sometimes seen to be utter contradictions, but must
be nonetheless held as true.

Immanence and transcendance,

freedom and necessity, time and eternity, disclosure and fulfillment, and the like are polari.ties which stand in tension
to one another, contradicting, overlapping, intersecting.
Robert E. Fitch claims to have listed well over one hundred
such polarities as found in Niebuhr's books. 2 Throughout his
writings appear such sentences as "insofar as
true, but insofar as • • • , it is not true. 11

...'

this is

All of this

malces for a rather complicated understanding of history, and
an even greater amount of confusion when trying to systematize
his thoughts.
2Robert E. Fitch, "Reinhold Niebuhr's Philosophy of
History," Reinhold Niebuhr: His Religious, Social and Polit~ Thought, ed. by Charres r.'Keg!ey anO: Robert 1·1:-.E'retall
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961), p. 300.

recognized in approaching
mplete distaste for the
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and temporal flux and

1

be" and "passing away."
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natural time. 11 3
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,'•

life is given meaning.
ception of a meaningful hisaatural cause as a sufficient
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concretions and configu-

nty, adduced by modern science,
sin the temporal process. 114
itself, is seen to be re.opment of human culture will
Id Histor:v: (New York:

i3.

Charles

30
overcome all evil and result in the fulfillment of human life.
Like the classical view, history is e~uated with the naturetime process, but unlike it, history derives its meaning via
the gradual triumph of human reason.
In order to understand fUlly why these two views of
history are so repugnant to Niebuhr, it will be well for us
to return to the subject of polarities and consider some to
which he gives special attention; freedom and necessity, man
within the temporal process yet transcending it, memory and
destiny, and disclosure and fulfillment.
Man is in nature. He is, for that reason, not of
nature. It is important to emphasize both parts.
Man is the creature of necessity and the child of
freedom. His life is determine~ by natural contingencies; yet his character develops by rising
above nature's necessities and accidents. With
reference to the purposes of his life, it is
significant that the necessities of nature are
accidents and contingencies. Sometimes he is
able to bend nature's necessities to his own
will; sometimes he must submit his destiny to
them.5

I•

Man, as a creature, is subject to the vicissitudes of nature,
influenced by its demands, driven b7 its impulses.
body and must therefore eat, drink, and sleep.
he must die.

He is limited by

in which he finds himself.

here~ity

He is a

And as a mortal

and by the environment

At every stage of his development,

man, in the individual sense as well as in the larger communal
sense, remains a creature of nature, bound by its necessities.
But man is more than this.

He is free to manipulate

the processes of nature, to impose his own will upon its forces.
5Reinhold Neibuhr, Beyond fragedy (New York:
Scribner's Sons, 1937), pp. 292-29,.

Charles
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The fact that he can think about his limitations, consider
his physical necessities, removes him from the purely animal
level and is an aspect of his freedom.

He can seek to com-

prehend the temporal process, discern the seauence, causal1 ties and recurrences of the natural world.

He is free to

make decisions in relation to the natural world and to other
men.

Because he is free to choose, one can never be certain

about what will follow any given moment.
choose the unforeseen.

He is free to

For this reason, man cannot be

studied exclusively as one studies the world of nature.
he is also free in a deeper sense.

But

"Man is a spirit who

stands outside of nature, life, himself, his reason and the
world. 116 In this respect, man is capable of transcending the
flux of the natural world and of considering the whole
meaning of human history.

This is the radical freedom which

allows man to understand the meaning of the warfare of good
and evil in life and to possess a surveillance of reason itself.

Man is therefore both creature and creator.

H.e is

involved in the flux of the natural world and is limited by
its necessities.

But he also transcends nature and time and

thus may create new levels of coherence and meaning as well
as contemplate his own finiteness.
Niebuhr's concept of history is built on this twosided predicament of freedom and necessity and of man's involvement in the temporal process yet his capacity to transcend it.

6Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destin~ £! M.fil.E.
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949), One Vol. edition,
I, P • 3.
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He is never freed completely from natural necessity, but he
is also never limited completely to it.

This is the realm of

history.
Man's ability to transcend the flux of nature
gives him the capacity to make history. Human
history is rooted in the natural process but it
is something more than either the determined
sequences of natural causation or the capricious
variations and occurrences of the natural world.
It is compounded of natural necessity and human
freedom. Man's freedom to transcend the natural
flux gives him the possibility of grasping a
span of time in his consciousness and thereby
knowing history. It also enables him to change,
reorder and transmute the causal sequences of
nature and thereby make history. The very ambiguity of the word "history" (as something that
occurs and as something that is remembered and
recorded) reveals the common source of both
human actions and human knowledge in human freedom.?
There are four consequences which obviously follow from
this approach and they are an integral part of Niebuhr's understanding of history.

The first is the fact that man's freedom

is the source of his dignity and his creativity, but it is
also the source of his peril.

A finite and a physical creature

yet gifted with the capacity to survey eternity, he is able
to look at himself as one creature among many, but he is
also able to look at the world with his mind being the focusing center of the whole.

Thus is he ever tempted, in his

freedom, to make himself the center of all.
refuses to see his limitations.

Man is mortal, but he pre-

tends not to be and that is his sin.
because man is free.

In pride, he

This is possible only

In an excellent sermon on the Tower of

7Ibid., II, p. 1.

.....,,
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Babel, Niebuhr shows this to be the case even when speaking
of man in his communal life. 8 Inevitably, human cultures and
civilizations build towers through which they pretend to be
higher than their real height and claim a finality which is
not theirs to possess.

This two-dimensional existence of

freedom and necessity, of nature and spirit, places man in
tension and provides the possibility for nobility, but also
for sin.

A concomitant of this is the fact that the possi-

bility for sin is always with man and, because he can never
escape his limitations regardless of his striving, he is
aware that he can never achieve perfection.

It is important

to note that this is not a defect in the creation of man, but
rather a defect which is possible because man has been endowed
with freedom.
A second consequence is closely related to the above
and grows out of the fact that the meaning of history, by
reason of the freedom and transcendance of the human spirit,
is never contained within or satisfied by the natural-historical process and thus must point beyond itself.

Man, in

search of .fulfillment, but faced with the knowledge of his
limitations and of the imperfections within natural history,
cannot believe that the meaning of history can be found in
such incompleteness.
Insofar as he transcends the temporal process,
he can discern many meanings in life and history
by tracing various coherences, sequences, causali t1es and recurrences through which the

events of history are ordered. Eut insofar as
man is himself in the temporal process which he
seeks to comprehend, every sequence and realm
of coherence points to a more final source of
meaning than man is able to comprehend rationally.9
Insofar as he is involved in history, the disclosure of life's meaning must come to him in
history. In so far as he transcends history
the source of life's meaning must transcend
history.lo
Thus we are confronted with another polarity in the
thought of Niebuhr:

disclosure and fulfillment.

this is the polarity of mystery and meaning.

Akin

to

Within the

curious mixture of freedom and necessity, lies the realm of
history.

Its meaning is partially intelligible, but not

completely, partially disclosed but not fully.

Filled with

obscurities, incoherences and unfulfilled meanings, history
points beyond itself.

We will deal vith this more completely

when we come to the discussion of the relationship of Ohristiani ty and history.
The third and fourth consequences have great bearing
on the way in which one approaches the study of history.
The third has to do with the relationship of the past to the
present.

If one is to comprehend man, he must come to know

his history.

In a very real sense man is a being in history

who has a history, but it is also true that history is in
man.

Instead, therefore, of relegating history to something
9Niebuhr, Faith~ Histor~, p. 49.

10Niebuhr, The Nature ~Destiny of ~' II, p. 36.
(Two interesting sermons on this subject appeared under the
titles "City Which Hath Foundation" and "Mystery and Meaning"
in his book Discerning~ Signs .Q.f.~ Time~.)
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remote and forgotten, it must be seen as a dimension of the
present.

The past dwells within the present in two ways:

(1) through our memory of events, and (2) through the immediacy of the situations which the past places at our doorsteps.

These might be viewed as the polarity of memory and

destiny.

Niebuhr sees memory as "the fulcrum of freedom for

man in history" inasmuch as by memory man is able to grasp
the uniqueness of historical events without reducing them to
natural necessities.11

Memory understands that events do not

necessarily follow from previous events, but sees the mixture
of freedom and necessity which gives uniqueness to every historical event.

By memory, man is able to rise above the

temporal flux and interpret present realities through the
uniqueness of past events.

This he does not by logic but

by memory which is one of the facets of his freedom.

..

'

The past is present not only in our memory of its
events, but also in the present realities which we confront
resulting from those events.

Niebuhr cites, as an example,

the memory of an accident, but also the scar on the forehead.

More seriously, he points not only to the memory of

the slaves which our fathers brought from Africa but also
the reality of the problems existing on the contemporary
scene.

We cannot, by human freedom, revoke the social con-

figurations which have developed from decisions of the past.
Facts of locale of birth, economic status of parents, political and cultural traditions, laws and institutions present
11Niebuhr, Faith and History, p. 19.

.
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themselves with irrevocable force upon the present.

Some

are facts of nature while others are facts of history which
combined freedom and necessity.

All of them, however, are

part of the present and, in their complexity, they represent
a confusion of freedom and destiny.
The fourth and final consequence which grows out of
Niebuhr's approach to history through his understanding of
freedom and necessity is the need to distinguish sharply between history and nature.

As we have observed, events in his-

tory cannot be understood as having been dictated by natural
necessity.
create

Because of his unique freedom, man is able to

curious and unexpected and unpredictable emergences
and emergencies in history." 12 Confronted with a multitude
11

of possibilities, he is able

to be a creator of historical

events which do not yield themselves to examination by the
natural sciences?Dr to bases for accurate predictions of the
fUture.

History is such a compound of freedom and necessity

that historical events are complexly interwoven into and
superimposed upon each other.

"The complex of events which

constitutes history is thus such a bewildering confusion of
freedom and destiny, that the historical cannot be made to
conform to the patterns of either logical or natural coherence. 11 13
Furthermore, it must be observed that man's freedom over
time results in historical structures and patterns, institutions
12 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Structure of Nations and Emnires, (New York: Charles S'C'ribner's SonS";" 1959), p-;-:f.~
13Gordon Harland, The Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 92.
-
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and cultures, which transcend the life span of the organisms
of nature.

Oom:i;a.red to the slow mutations of the forms of

nature, novelties of human creativity may erupt with such a
tempo and in such dimensions that historical change may be
seen to be radically different.
Historical patterns are in a category of reality
which cannot be identified with the structure
o.f nature. They are to be sharply distinguished
from natural structures because they represent a
compound o.f freedom and necessity.14
To the degree that men are not .free, their actions may be
scientifically charted.

But to the degree that they are free,

the events in history are so

varie~

and complex that their

meaning may not be easily comprehended.
izations are seen as impossible.

Scientific general-

History can therefore never

., ......
(

;.

,·,I

be equated with nature.

,,

It follows, too, that knowledge of history cannot be
approached in the same way as knowledge of nature.

,.·'
.....

At this

point Niebuhr frankly admits that he is confronted with the
problem of relativism of historical knowledge and that from
it there is no rational escape.
on two fronts:

This is historical relativism

(1) relativism resulting .from the complexity

of historical causation, and (2) relativism resulting from
the ambiguous position of the observer.

Niebuhr deals with

this subject extensively in his book The Self and the Dramas

-----,-···-

~f .!ll.§..~or~.

and emphatically points out the impossibility of

subjecting history, with its complexity of causation, to the
precise analyses of scientists and philosophers, who, to his
--"""'-r. . . _.. _ _ _ ... __ .,. , ......... ~~· ......... - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

14Reinhold Niebuhr, The Self and the Dramas of Historz
(New York: Charles Scribner's SOllS, ...195517 p. 45.

.,
'·
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chagrin, consistently try to understand historical dramas
in terms of natural or ontological necessity.

The events

of history involve the motives of the agents of action, their
resentments, their ambitions and jealousies, in addition to
the concentration of multiple social and historical forces.
The historian will do well to approach his task with considerable phrQ~esis (practical wisdom),

The position of the

observer of the historical scene is moreover such that he
cannot claim objectivity for the "observers of this drama
are invariably themselves involved in the historical flux
which they are trying to survey. 1115 Historical distance from
the event is likewise of little value in resolving the problem
of historical relativism for the viewer remains within the
temporal flux and. must therefore observe the events from his

,.·

particular locus and perspective.

·',...

There are, of course, valid social and historical
sciences. They are le.gi timate when the scientists
know themselves to be historians, rather than
natural scientists; and therefore recognize that
their generalizations are hazardous and speculative.15
There is no solution to the problem of historical relativism,
but careful and honest historical inquiry by historians who
report from their various perspectives rather than from
scientists who claim empirical observation and scientific
observation, can yield valid historical knowledge.

Extreme

biases, of course, will be refUted and obvious propagandists

15 Ibid., p. 53.
16Ibid., p. 45.

,. :
,·
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ignored.

The reports and interpretations of the events of

history by honest historians will provide the only solution
to the problem, but even then the knowledge cannot have the
exactness of knowledge in the field of natural science.
Inasmuch as knowledge of history is always interpretation of history, unless, of course, one resorts to the
listing of objective data without evaluation of any kind, and
such is of little value, the meaning of history and of human
life comes into consideration.

Either question presupposes

an ultimate framework of .meaning and such a framework is
derived not from an investigation of history itself, but
from

religious faith.
History in its totality and unity is given a meaning
by some kind of religious fatth in the sense that
the conceut of meaning is derived from ultimate
presuppositions about the character of time and
eternity, which are not fruits of detalied analyses of historical events.17

It is within this faith that history may be seen either to
have meaning or to remain meaningless.

If, as we have noted,

history does indeed point beyond ltself, and history is fulfilled in some point beyond time, and the polarity of mystery
and meaning may be comprehended, then faith must supply the
framework.

It is at this point that we therefore must con-

sider Niebuhr's understanding of Christianity and. history.
Ohristianiti

~

Histori

The Christian faith begins with, and is founded
upon, the affirmation that the life, death, and

17

Niebuhr,

Faith~

History, p. 118.
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resurrection of Christ represent an event in
history, in and through which a disclosure of
the whole meaning of history occurs.18
The demand for religious faith as a framework of meaning is
met by Niebuhr with the insistence that the whole historical
drama becomes meaningful by being oriented from the Christian
perspective.

As he has noted, specific presuppositions are

mandatory for any interpretation of the meaning of history.
He readily admits that his interpretation rests squarely on
Christian presuppositions.
The focal point of Niebuhr's interpretation of history
is the revelatory event of Christ and, though it is a scandal
to find the meaning of history in anhi.storical event, it is
nonetheless the only source of understanding history.

The

truth of the revelation can be apprehended only by faith,
but, given the revelation, reason can show that it gives the
only adequate understanding of the character of history and
the meaning of human life.
In considering the significance of the revelatory event
of Christ, we will want to consider Niebuhr's understanding of
such things as the Incarnation, the Cross, and the Resurrection.

It will be well, however, if we first give attention

to his treatment of symbol and myth.

At times, it seems that

Niebuhr uses these terms interchangeably, but actually he
does make a slight distinction.

A symbol is a partial and

particular aspect of life which is used to illuminate the
meaning of the whole, to point to the eternal.
18 Ibid., p. 2 6 •

Symbols are
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the tools of myths in that they are used to give meaning beyond
the limits of their immediate and obvious meaning.

They become

instruments of linking the realms of time and eternity.

Thus,

almost any idea or event may have symbolic significance in its
ability to communicate a larger truth.

The

myth, on the other

hand, is a story, whose origin may or may not be known, Which
serves to communicate profound religious truth.

The term here

does not mean mere fairy tale or fable, but rather means an
attempt to give depth to history as an artist does to a painting.

In Beyond Tragedy, myth and symbol are discussed in the

opening sermon and are seen to be both deceptive and true.19
They are deceptive insofar as their elements may draw such
attention to themselves that they obscure or even hide their
deeper meanings:

they are true inasmuch as they are the pur-

veyors of truth about the ultimate meaning of life.
ceivers, they have frequently been misunderstood.

As deSome have

treated myths with attention only to the facts and events of
the natural order while others have viewed them as scientific
absurdities and therefore of no value.

Biblical mythology has

fallen prey to both errors with literalism being the result
of the first and rationalistic dismissal the result of the
second.

It is Niebuhr's point that the1 must be taken seri-

ously, though not literally.

He is keenly aware of the fact

that as conveyors of eternal truths in time they are the
only means of speaking of the trans-historical.
19

Niebuhr, Beyond Tragedx, pp. 3-24.

"Meaning can
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be attributed to history only by a mythology.

1120

Biblical

symbols and myths are therefore an attempt to point to ultimate meaning from the position of finiteness:

they reveal

true insights about God-man relationships.
Niebuhr is quite clear in his treatment of the creation
story and of the fall, but there is considerable ambiguity in
his treatment of the Incarnation, the Cross and the Resurrection.

It is the affirmation of the New Testament that Christ

is the end of history as well as a new beginning.

In His

life, death, and resurrection, the meaning of man's existence
is .fulfilled in that God is seen to have a resource of mercy
and love and forgiveness which completes history.

In Christ,

there is a new beginning in that man, seeing the true meaning of life and responding with faith and repentance, may
experience renewal of life.

This is the wisdom of faith,

however, and may not be reduced to rational comprehension.
In Christian thought Christ is both the perfect
man, 'the Second Adam' who had restored the perfection of what man was and ought to be; and the
Son of God, who transcends all possible human
life.21
By this Niebuhr means that Christ is the revelation of the
very impossible possibility which the Sermon on the Mount
elaborates in ethical terms, that is the absolute law of
love.

"The Jesus of history is a perfect symbol of the abso-

lute in history because the perfect love to which pure spirit
20 Reinhold Niebuhr, Reflections on the End of an Era
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934):--J;'. 123:- ~ ~
21N1ebuhr, Beyond Tragedy, p. 16.
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aspires is realized in the drama of his life and cross.1122
Seen With reference to the cross, Christ is the norm of human
existence which is derived from the ultimate relation of the
divine to history, a relation of love.

By

His freedom God

"1 nvolves Himself in the guilt and suffering of free men who

have, in their freedom, come in conflict with the structural
character of reality. 112 3

The orthodox statement of the two-

fold nature of Christ is deceptive in many ways and yet it is

true in that it expresses the paradoxical relationship to
divine ~gane which comes down to man to conquer and human
gga~~

Which rises above history to a sacrificial act.

The

tragedy of the cross was necessary simply because it was the

f'Ullest expression of God's love and forgivenese.

The Cross

stands as a judgment upon all men who, in their search .for
meaning, seek to make themselves the center o.f the whole.
But it also stands as 11the assurance that judgment is not

the .final word of God. 1124 The mercy 0£ God does not wipe out
the distinctions of good and evil in history but rather overcomes what man cannot overcome by himself.

Thus, the 11.fe

and Cross of Ohrist reveal the true nature of God and unleash
for man new power and meaning in his life.
The Resurrection of Obrist, while it cannot be ascertained as an historical fact as can the Cross, cannot be dismissed as irrelevant.

-------~--~-·"··---~-----------------

22Niebuhr, Refle9tions • • • ' P• 287.
23Niebuhr, ~ Nature and Destinz of ~, II, p. 71.
241.!?1-J!., I, p. 14 2.

'.,.
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The church as a fellowship of believers was
obviously founded upon the conviction of the
fact of the resurrection. This 'fact' contained an alternation in the story through
faith's apprehension of the significance of
the story. To recognize that the Oross was
something more than a noble tragedy and its
victim something else than a good man who died
for his ideals; to behold rather that this suffering was indicative of God's triumph over
evil through a love which did not stop at involvement in the evil over which it triumphed;
to see, in other words, the whole mystery of
God's mercy disclosed is to know that the
crucified Lord had triumphed over death • • •
It is the revelatory depth of the fact which
is the primary concern of faith.25
The Resurrection is both the triumph of Christ over sin
the proof of God's power to overcome death.

and

It is important

to note that, to Niebuhr, the miracle of the recognition of
the true Christ in the Resurrection was an event of immediacy
and not one which is grounded in a slow-dawning consciousness
of the church.

The Resurrection is a miracle without which

the church could not have come into existence.
ion and the Resurrection are

~

able to find meaning in history.

The Crucifix-

events through which man is
They are God's word of

revelation to man that discloses His

sovereignt~

over history

as well as His justice and mercy and that discloses the mystery of His relation to history.
From these Christian presuppositions there are many
implications which Niebuhr draws.

Five of them deserve at

least our brief attention.

(1)

Christianity deals with the whole of history and

not just a particular people.
25

It views by faith certain

Niebuhr, Jqith and Histo!,Y, pp. 147-148.

1•
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events in history and proclaims that these events have relevance for all men in that they transcend the whole panorama
of time and reveal the source and meaning and end of all history.

God covenants with men from any nation who are called,

that is, "who are able to apprehend by faith that this person,
drama and event of history discloses the power and the love
which is the source and the end of the whole historical drama.n26
(2)

Faith in the sovereignty and love of God gives

unity to history. but it is always faith.

The significance

of the events of the life, death, and resurrection of Christ
come to man by revelation and not by sight or reason.

This

is not to say that reason is of no value in man's relationship
with God nor that Christianity is completely irrational, but
it is to say that man must face and acknowledge his limitations.
The revelation of God cannot be proved:
only by faith.

it can be accepted

Examples abound in the history of Christianity

of attempts to "prove" what is revealed.

Even Biblical stories

such as the virgin birth are little more than efforts to give
credibility to the revelation of the significance of Christ.
To do so

is to make faith less than it must be.

(3)

The Cross of Christ reveals the true distinction

between evil and good.

Instead of negating the evil of man,

it reminds him of the reality of evil.

Man sees the true

norm of human existence and is vividly aware that he falls
short.

But he sees even more than this:

he sees that his

freedom, which is the source of his dignity and creativity,

26

Ibid., p .. 27.
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is also the source of his sin.

Sin is placing one•s self in

the role of God, in the center of the whole, as the being
around which all of history moves.

In his freedom, man re-

fuses to recognize his limitations and claims for himself
that which rightfully belongs to God.

Viewing the Cross,

it is impossible to calm his guilt any longer by pointing to
natural necessities.

In the Cross, the distinction of good

and evil is preserved and affirmed and God's judgment upon
sin is made all the more severe.

(4)

In Christ, man sees the norm of human existence

and accepts the law of love as the ethical ideal.
ethic is an impossible possibility.
things:

Such an

This results in two

(1) ethical relativism, and (2) the realization

that the absolute is never attainable.

Ethical relativism

is not, in this sense, that held by some who say that "moral
principles are only relative to particular culture and situations.1127

Instead it is a relativism based on the fact that

love is the source of ethical decisions and actions and not
some objective moral law.

Because, however, the life-ethic

can never be perfectly applied in the realm of history, man
is caught in a contradiction.

Niebuhr has been emphatic in

his belief that there are no simple choices in the problems
which man and society face.

The situation of man is that he

must choose the lesser of two or more evils rather than an
undiluted good.

The law of love remains, nonetheless, the

ideal and its relevancy is three-fold.

It serves as a

2 7Reinhold Niebuhr, "Christianity and Moral Law,"
The Christian Century, Vol. LXX, No. 48, Dec. 2, 1953, P• 1386.
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measure of our failure, providing a basis for an evaluation
of our achievements and it serves as an absolute standard
toward which we move.

Finally, the ideal of love serves as

a principle of discriminating and making decisions.
Where there are two or more alternatives, both
admittedly falling short of the ideal. the law
of love provides the criterion by which we may
determine which of these 'second-bests' apnroximates most closely to the idea1.28
·

(5)

In an earlier section, we noted that Niebuhr con-

tends that history, filled with obscurities, incoherences and
unfulfilled meanings, points beyond itself and that the end
of history is not a point in history, but beyond it.

In the

light of the Christian faith, this takes on a new dimension
of meaning.
Everything in human life and history moves
toward the end. By reason of man's subjection to nature and finiteness this 'end' is
a point where that which exists ceases to be.
It is finis. By reason of man's rational
freedom the 'end' has another meaning. It is
the purpose and goal of his life and work.
It is telos.29
The Christian faith fully understands the tension between these
two and, though it cannot solve the problem, it looks toward
the end of history with faith and hope rather than with fear.
Finis is the end of time, but telos, the Christian faith insists, lies outside of history.

The Christian faith makes a

further claim and that is that in the revelation of God in
Christ the end of history as telos has already come with a
28G.H.O. MacGregor, !.rut Relevance of ~ Impossible
Ideal, (New York: The Fellowship of Reconciliation, n.d.), p. ~
2 9Niebuhr, ~Nat~~~ Destin~ of~' II, p. 287.
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disclosure of the meaning of history though not a full realization of that meaning.

It is one of the supreme paradoxes

of Christianity that telos has preceded finis.

Such a faith

means that the world has been overcome and that the incoherences and incompletions of history have been in a sense
illuminated.

But such a faith also points to the end when

all of the corruptions and incompletions of history shall be
completely overcome.
In the New Testament the eschata or last things are
described. in three fundamental symbols:
Last Judgment, and the Resurrection.

the Parousia, the

Niebuhr sees the Second

Coming of Christ as dominant over the other two symbols inas-

-

,,.

much as the latter are actually expressions of Christ's return
as triumphant judge and redeemer.

The Second Coming of Christ

is symbolically significant because (1) it demonstrates the
fact that since Christ is the norm of all human existence,
existence cannot defy that norm:

(2) it expresses the Chris-

tian hope of fulfillment of life while holding fast the
essential conception of the relation of time and eternity,
placing fulfillment at the end of history and not in some far
off abstraction:

(3) it demonstrates the ultimate triumph

of the law of love:

and (4) it witnesses to the sufficiency

of God's sovereignty over all the world and history.
The symbol of the Last Judgment in New Testament
mythology enshrines three basic ideas in the Christian understanding of life and history.

(1) Christ Himself will be the

Judge and He will judge men not by their finiteness but by
their sin as seen by their own ideal possibility which has
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been known in history.

(2) The distinction between good and

evil will be affirmed instead of swallowed up in some nebulous eternity.

Granted that historical realities are ambig-

uous. making absolute distinctions within history impossible.
the final judgment allows this necessity and possibility.

(3) Coming at the "end 11 of history, the Last Judgment symbolically demonstrates a denial of any possibility that history can fulfill or complete itself.

Any idea that by

growth and progress man can emancipate himself from his
guilt and sin is fully refuted.

Fulfillment can come only

at the end and from God, though it is related to the whole
process of history.
The third symbol which the New Testament employs to
describe the eschata is that of the resurrection.

The idea

of the resurrection of the body is a hope which implies the
redemption of the whole man.

Eternity will fulfill the rich

variety of the temporal process and yet will in some way maintain the freedom of man.

The body symbolizes man's relation

to nature and the contribution which nature makes to individuals and to all historical realizations.

The resurrection

of the body further implies that the whole unity of history
belongs to eternity and that all of its particularities
shall be brought into the harmony of the whole.

The resur-

rection of the body thus has individual and social significance and the end of history is viewed as loving fellowship
with God.
All three of the symbols have great meaning for the
Christian understanding of history.

Though they may not be
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taken literally, it is important that they be taken
seriously.
At the conclusion of his book, The Self and

~

...
D-.r..,.am-.a-.s-.

of History:, Niebuhr makes the folloWi.ng statement.
The dramas of history contain many facts and
sequences which must be rationally correlated.
But the frame of meaning in which these facts
and sequences are discerned must be apprehended
by faith because it touches the realm of mystery
beyond rational comprehension. The ultimate
question always remains whether the mystery ia
so absolute as to annul the meaning of the historical drama or a 'light that shineth in darkness,' which clarifies, rather than annuls, all
the strange and varie. gated dramas of human
history.50
Our discussion of Niebuhr's concept of history points
clearly to his belief that Christ is the key to the meaning
of history.

Within this framework, we understand him to be

primarily saying the following things.
History deals with man in his wholeness and therefore
must be sharply distinguished from nature.
Freedom and necessity are dialectical realities and
man's freedom is the source of his creativity as well as of
his evil.

Because this is true, history itself can never be

viewed as redemptive.

Christ only can serve as judge and

redeemer.
History has both unity and meaning, but this can be
acknowledged only through faith in God and not through
empirical evidence.
History is a complexity of incoherences, fragments,
and incompleteness and points beyond itself for meaning and
30Niebuhr, ~ ~ ~ ~ Dramas 2! History, p. 242.
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fulfillment.

Man, even though he responds in faith and

repentance to Christ and acknowledges God as the center of
the whole, must accept h1s limitations ano. the trutn tnat
only 1n tne end of history will he find fUlfillment.

CRAFTER III
COMPARISON AND CRITIQUE
Rather than approach this aspect of our task by criticizing each of the men and then comparing them, or doing the
reverse by comparing them first and then criticizing separately, it seems feasible to combine these two and move
through their thought comparing and criticizing at the same
time.

At certain points, Niebuhr and Bultmann lend them-

selves to the same criticisms.

Even ideas which differ may

sometimes be criticized for the same reasons.

There are, of

course, areas of their thought which must be treated separately and this we will do.
For the purposes of organization, we will follow the
outline used earlier by considering first their general views
and then their views of Christianity and history.
Bultmann has attempted to defend his position with regard to the subjectivity of the historical scholar as being,
in effect, his objectivity, but the concept still presents
problems.

It !.!!. true that the presuppositions of historical

research, particularly in terms of pre-understanding and in
terms of the investigator standing within history, necessarily
result in subjectivity, but it does not follow that the researcher, recognizing these facts, is therefore objective.
Indeed, if the historian must make use of secondary sources
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or the observations of other historians then he necessarily
is giving subjective interpretation to subjective interpretation of objective events.
~

absurdum.

Obviously, this could go on

Perhaps we must say that historical study can

never be objective and would be meaningless if it could.

A

certain objectivity may be achieved toward one's own presuppositions, but this will surely prevent one from believing
that objectivity in history can ever be attained.

Recognizing

history as remembered and interpreted event, the existentialist
would isolate himself in his own decisions.

At the same time,

it must be said that the historian of integrity surely goes
to his material with sincere intent to record objective fact
as best he can.
and fiction.

This is what distinguishes it from legend

If Bultmann carries this too far, he is, as a

New Testament scholar, destroying his own tools.
Niebuhr has insisted on the relativity of historical
knowledge in the light of the manifold causations of historical
events and in the light of the ambiguous position of the observer.

While he does not do this in existentialist terIDin-

ology, he is in agreement with Bultmann regarding the impossibility of objective recording of history that goes beyond
the recording of mere data.

He does not, however, say that

a recognition of this subjectivity provides the historical
scholar with objectivity.

Actually, Niebuhr's concern is

much more that the interpreter of history be an historian
instead of a natural scientist or a philosopher and that
such an historian recognize fUlly his limitations and the
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hazards of his generalizations and interpretations.

Niebuhr's

view of the problem of historical relativism seems to be much
more healthy than Bultmann's.
Another area of comparison is at the point of the analysis of the present.

Both men see history as living in the

present and both acknowledge the existence of the past and
the future within that present.

But while Bultmann places

his real emphasis on history as being future-directed, Niebuhr
deals primarily with history as past-directed.

It is as if

one were saying that history is pulled forward while the other
were saying that history is pushed forward.

There are several

observations that might well be made.
While the future of man influences his decisions in
every moment in terms of intention, it is also true that
much that actually transpires is not what he had intended.
Many of the leaders of the Protestant Reformation or the
French Revolution threw up their hands in horror when they
saw the things which actually took place, declaring that they
had never intended to produce anything like that.
moving play

~

The very

Bloody Tenet is an excellent dramatization

of this very fact as Roger Williams is transported to the contemporary American scene to witness the long-range results of
his plea for religious freedom.

This is all simply to say

that the idea of future-directed man must be seen within

limitations.
In contrast to Bultmann, NiebUhr places his emphasis
on history as paBt-direoted.

It is interesting to note that

even though his understanding of freedom acknowledges the
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wide possibilities of decision in any given moment, he does
not put much stress on the influence of these possibilities
within the present where the decision is made.

It must be

acknowledged that he does recognize that the intentions of man
do have their effect, but there is not, in his thought, much
sense of man being "pulled," so to speak, by his future.
One wonders why, as a dialectician, he does not hold these
two aspects of man's present in greater balance.
At this point in our discussion, it appears wise to
consider points in each of these men's writings which cannot
be compared, but which must be criticized.

We are thinking

specifically of Bultmann's analysis of modern scientific
thought and of Niebuhr's treatment

~f

the condition of man.

One of the weakest points in Bultmann's concept of
history lies in his understanding of modern scientific
thought.

When he discusses history in his Gifford lectures,

he makes it quite plain that he sees history as movement of
process founded on the connection of single events in a chain
of oause and effect, a continuity which allows no room for
intervention from an outside source which might be thought
of as supernatural.

This is likewise made clear as he ap-

proaches demythologizing for he presupposes that modern man,
influenced by the natural sciences, is an independent unity
that cannot possibly accept a redemptive event brought about
by transoendant intervention, nor any phenomena tba.t stand
as exceptions to the natural laws of creation.

Bultmann

leaves himself open for criticism at at least two points.
To begin with, it is a bit questionable whether any
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theologian should set himself up as capable of speaking in
the name of contemporary scientific thought.

The fact of the

matter is, as Malevez has correctly observed,
If there is something of which we can be quite
certain, for us all, it is this, that in the
form which it has assumed during recent decades,
science has given up the attempt to make a picture of the world at all, because it knows that
such a picture cannot possibly be created.l
Secondly, even if one does not go to the opposite extreme
and accept the Principle of Uncertainty, the concept of
scientific determinism has been brought into serious question.
Not only has science no authority to establish the principle
of determinism in physical reality as necessary, there seems
to be considerable evidence that, indeed, events .2.Q. occur
which have no cause, phenomena which really are new.

Whether

this is proved true or merely held as a possibility, Bultmann
cannot use the principle of determinism as a basic part of
modern thought.

A further problem regarding Bultmann's

treatment of the causal sequence is the transoendanoe of
man and the place of his intention.

One must ask whether

these intentions stand within or without the sequence.

If

they stand outside of the sequence, then is there an outside
reality which may affect something within the sequence?

And

is his eschatologioal being, which is so much a part of his
personal decisions, affected by the causal sequence?

If man's

intentions and decisions are involved in the cause-effect
sequence, then where is the order of nature and history to
claim the sequence unbreakable?
lMalevez, .2.12.• cit., p. 127.
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Even if one ignores all of these arguments from the
point of physics, there is reason to believe that modern man
has no problem accepting the possibility of divine intervention.

The attention given by many devout and intelligent

Christians to the whole subject of miraculous healings would
lead one to conclude that such an idea is not untenable.
Bultmann's thought hangs heavily on this aspect of his analysis of modern man.

If it is false or even questionable then

his whole theory of history is in trouble, but particularly
at this point of ignoring or demythologizing anything which
smacks of the supernatural or miraculous.
Turning to Niebuhr's analysis of man, we are confronted with two problems, ma.n's evil and man's transcendance.
With reference to the first, this aspect of his thought is
probably the most well known.

That man's sin stems basically

from his freedom, and that it expresses itself in pride and
in sensuality are important truths to be recognized.

The

point in question is whether Niebuhr emphasizes man's sin
to the extent that he should be left in nothing but despair
and gloom.

We must acknowledge that over against this

Niebuhr places the possibilities and asserts that in every
situation there are untried opportunities to apply the spirit
of love.

It is true, too, that he points out the creativity

and nobility of man which is the other side of his !reedom.
The problem is holding the good and evil in proper tension.
One would like to hear him say a bit more about the imago
~

in every man.

Perhaps in his efforts to combat the

extreme of liberalism with

its

stress on the goodness of
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man, it is understandable that he would over-emphasize the
evil in man.

One wonders, too, if, since apparently there

is some evil in all of man's acts in the light of the fact
that his motives are never pure and the ideal of love is
unattainable, there might not be some truth in the opposite.
Is there genuine good in history as surely as there is evil?
Niebuhr points out that the Cross of Christ is a reminder
of the sin and evil in history, but is it not also the
reminder of the good?
With reference to the second problem, man's transcendance, Niebuhr is right in recognizing this unique ability
of man to step outside of himself, so to speak.

The question

is whether man, by doing so, participates in what appears to
be another realm of being and whether he actually transcends
his reason.

Niebuhr points in one place to man's fear of

death and to his anticipation of another dimension of
reality as being proofs of man's tranacendance.
accomplished beyond reason?

But is this

There is no doubt about the

reality of the fear since it involves the unknown, but in what
way is this an aspect of man's transcendance instead of his
reason?

It would seem that any image of death or life beyond

might be nothing more than a composite of what man knows by
reason in history.

Niebuhr can easily be misunderstood at

this point, but the question must be asked.
The subject of myth is treated by both Bultmann and
Niebuhr though the former dwells on it at much greater
length, perhaps because of his interest as a New Testament
scholar.

The two men approach the subject with considerable
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difference, but come out much closer than they went in.

Both,

however, are open to criticism.
Attention will be given later to some of the specific
instances of Bultmann's demythologizing, but perhaps now is
an appropriate time to remark on some concerns about the
whole process.

Basically, Bultmann is correct in seeing the

need to demythologize the New Testament where the first century world-view tends to obscure the message.

And he is

right in understanding that the myths are not to be discarded
but rather re-interpreted for modern man.

But there are

several aspects of the subject which Bultmann fails to properly acknowledge.
We have already noted the inaccuracies of his analysis
of modern thought and the problems of subjectivity.

Their

implications for the approach to demythologizing are obvious.
But as for myth as an expression of the other-worldly and
divine in terms of this-worldly and human, he does not seem
to adequately recognize the inevitability of mytho-poetic
language wherever one speaks of the activity of God.

The

language of religious and spiritual truth and experience, as
contrasted with science,is that of myth and poetry, symbol
and imagery.

It shall always be so.

Even such simple terms

as "Father" or usontt are mythological when used in reference
to God and man in relationship, but man has no choice but to
so express himself.

Bultmann does acknowledge this, but he

does not seem to see that this is as true today as it was when
the New Testament was written.

In re-interpreting the kerygma
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for modern man, the task is as much one of transmythologizing
as it is demythologizing.
A further recognition follows and that is that there
may well be a twentieth century myth.

In the world-view, we

have seen that "cause and effect" might also be the language
of myth.

For that matter, so might "process."

There is

really little doubt that two thousand years from now, possible catastrophic events not accounted for, man will look
back on us and think that our world-view is quite naive
and unrealistic.
We might also observe that there is mythological
language even within the existentialist philosophy which
Bultmann employs.

Such phrases as "being-in-the-world,"

"divine transoendance," "primordial understanding;" and "leap
of faith" reflect the need for interpretation.

It cannot be

simply assumed that this language communicates to modern
man any better than, or if as well as, the present language
of the New Testament.

Indeed, one must have a:ta.irly ad-

vanced knowledge of the particular school of thought even
to know what Bultmann is talking about.
It might further be observed that somehow, down through
the ages, many a simple peasant has been able to reach high
levels of' Godly-living or even "authentic being" through a
personal knowledge of Jesus Christ without ever feeling the
need to remove the Biblical myths.

This is not to make light

of the need to demythologize, but simply to say that God's
activity with men is not always dependent upon our scholarly
pursuits.

So much, for now, for Bultmann's demythologizing.

:s
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As early as 1920 Niebuhr made the observation that
"Religion is poetry.

The truth in the poetry is vivified by

adequate poetic symbols and is therefore more convincing than
the poor prose with which the average preacher must attempt
to grasp the ineffable."3

Unlike Bultmann, Niebuhr fully

realizes the necessity of expressing the religious truths in
mytho-poetic language.

Nor is he as anxious as Bultmann to

extract the meaning from the myths and re-phrase it for contemporary ma.n by some process of transmytholog1z1ng.

On the

contrary, NiebUhr takes the mythological expressions seriously
and sees the truth expressed within them.

Myth provides the

key to understanding history and the God-man relationship.

As supra-historical and supra-rational, myth is the word of
God to man "coming to him from beyond the boundaries of human
knowledge; • • •

Its form and content belong together, es-

sentially and inseparably." 4

For Niebuhr, myth expresses a

supra-historical and supra-rational truth about men, while
for Bultmann, myth is always an expression, of subjective
understanding of self.

One is cosmological, the other anthro-

pological.
The truth which the myth communicates about eternity

and time is essential to it.

Biblical literalists concretize

the myth and liberals cast myth aside entirely;
important truth which is there.

both miss the

This is an important and good

3N1ebuhr, Leavesfrom • , ,, p. 32.
York:

4Ra.ns Hoff'man, The Theolosi

of Reinhold Niebuhr (New
Charles Scr1bner 1 s Sons, 19501", p. 77.
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point of Niebuhr's and differs greatly from Bultmann's view
that the truth of the myth comes to each man from "something

out there."

.

Niebuhr may employ contemporary myth to commun-

icate truth, but by his understanding of Biblical mythology
it is impossible for him to transmythologize.

Niebuhr's main problem with myth deals with the relation of myth and symbol to historical events.

One is never

quite sure whether he is saying that there is an objective
historical event behind the myth/symbol and whether such is
necessary for the myth/symbol to be valid.
a Tower of Babel or an Ark of the Covenant?

Was there really
He treats the

Creation story as "primitive" myth and the Fall as non-historical, but he also
as myth/symbol.

explain~

the Trinity and the Incarnation

In one place he seems to be saying that as

a pointer toward the trans-historical, myth inevitably
falsifies history, while in another he seems to insist on the
reality of the historical event.

Some of the confusion may

be based on his sometimes interchangeable, sometimes distinctive usage, of the terms myth and symbol.
In one respect, NiebUhr's treatment of myth is most
satisfying.

In his collection of sermons, Beyond Tragedy,

he is particularly effective in discussing the essential
truths which are contained in some of the Biblical myths and
in considering the dialectical relation between the temporal
and the eternal.

On the other hand, Bultmann treats the

relationship of myth to history more definitely and with
greater consistency in his total approach to the subject.

l

If

l
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I

Niebuhr would clear up the ambiguity of myth and symbol, as

{

well as their relationship to objective history, his treat-

r

t
f

ment would be more acceptable.

I

these two men approach the subject of the Christian faith and

As we come to a consideration of the ways in which
history, there are comments which must be made regarding each
before any comparative statement oan be made.
The question of subjectivity arises again when we
turn to Bultmann's treatment of the Christian faith.

One

may be tempted to conclude that the faith rests completely
on one's personal experience and that, therefore, you may
have yours and I may have mine and they may not be in the
same tenets or the same god.
ing to me.

The criteria must be its mean-

Certainly, there can be no proof and decidedly

no proof-texts.

(Interestingly, Bultmann is a great employer

of proQf-texts, particularly in his two-volume Theolosz 2£.
the New ,testament.)

Furthermore, one can never answer the

question of why the Christian should claim that the Ohristevent was and is the decisive eschatological event.
and not someone else?

Why him

Why not John the Baptist, or Buddha

or any one of a number of "good" people?

Bultmann tries to

answer this in his "Reply to the Critics" when he says that

'God encounters us in His Word - 1.e. in a particular word,
in the proclamation inaugurated with Jesus Christ.

True, God

encounters us at all times in all places, but he cannot be
seen everywhere unless His Word comes to us as well and
makes the moment of revelation intelligible to ue in its own

64

light." 5

He elaborates on this to equate Jesus Ohrist with

the Word, but his insistence upon this being verifiable only
as an esohatologioal event for the individual still leaves
these questions open.
also be asked.

At this point, another question must

If the Christ-event as present reality is

dependent upon my response, is preaching of the kerygma the
Word of God only as I recognize it as such?

Further, would

Christ have be.en Christ if no one had responded?
to be a matter of pro!!!!, vs. Rro

§..!,

It seems

but actually shouldn't

it be seen to be both?
Most of Bultmann's problems arise out of a failure to
recognize the necessary relationship between historisch and
gesoh1chtl1ch.

He must either bring objective-history up to

existential history or visa-versa.

Even when agreeing with

him that Ohristian theology and Christian preaching must be
concerned with Jesus Christ as gesohiohtlioh, we must nonetheless insist that the historisch does have value and that,
in fact, there would be no saving events without certain
objeot1ve-h1storioal

events, The Christ

of faith cannot be

separated as eas11y from the Jesus of history as Bultmann
proposes.

He subordinates the objective-historical events

to the point of making the history of Jesus at least shadowy
and almost dooetically sp1r1tua1.

would deny this vigorously.

On quotable grounds, he

uThe agent of God's presence

and activity, the mediation of God's reconciliation of the
world unto himself, is a real figure of history. 116 He also
6Bultmann et al, Kerygma and Myth • • • , pp. 206-7.
6 IbidL, P• 44.

6$
confesses that it is the superb paradox that Jesus was both
human and divine.7

But his overall emphasis on the existen-

tial-history denies this and he fails to see that a central
aspect of that superb paradox is that Jesus Christ was

~

torisch and geschichtlich.
As a result of this outlook, Bultmann has little con..

oern for the life of Jesus nor for the Biblical accounts of
that life.

Even though he acknowledges that the word of

God 1s not a "mysterious oracle, but a sober, factual account
of a human life, of Jesus of Nazareth, possessing saving
efficacy for man," he pays the account little attention and
holds the objective-historical happenings as of little import.8
Nils A. Dahl has criticized Bultmann squarely at this point:
The existentialist interpretation carried out
consistently signifies, • • • not only a demythologizing but also a deh1storicizing of
the New Testament. The deh1stor1.c1zing of the
New Testament is an ultra-Pauline extreme conditioned by existence philosophy which does
not do justice to the Gospels. Though it may
be true that the Gospels are proclamation and
witness, still it would be completely contrary
to the intention of the evangelists to declare
as irrelevant the inquiry into the historicity
of the narratives.9
To be interested in the earthly life of its Lord and Saviour
is a necessary characteristic of an historical religion:

to

desert such interest and divorce the Ohrist of faith from the
Jesus of History would be a precarious rooting, indeed.
7Bultmann, Theolosi-of ~~Testament, II, 123-127.
8Bul tmann et al., Kerygma ~ M;yth • • • , p. 44.
9oarl E. Braaten

and

~ H1stor;v:: ! S:ympo~ium .2!!.
\~ew York: Abingdon Press,

Roy A. Harr1ev1lle (eds.) Kerygma
the Theolog~ Qi. Rudolf Bultmann
1962), p. 1 3.
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The early Church was extraordinarily firm in its insistence that the religion should be firmly grounded in history
and, as though prov1dent1ally guided, would have no tampering
with the flesh of Ohrist as though he were someone who did not
endure real pain nor experience true humanity as they knew it.
Both in the canonizing of the New Testament (as it is absurd
to assume that the writers gave their pbantasy free reign)
and in the formulae of the early creeds, they guarded against
this error.

Though it is true that the Gospel accounts of

the earthly life of Jesus are written from within the position of faith and in light of the Resurrection, they can
hardly be dismissed as totally inaccurate and irrelevant.
Bultmann's treatment of the Cross gives little attention to its significance as historisch, again bowing out in
favor of

gesc~!chtl1ch.

To him, its significance is the

fact that God speaks to me in the Oross-event and it becomes
present reality for me as I make the Oross of Ohriat my own,
undergoing crucifixion with him, becoming free from myself.
As a redemptive event, it has cosmic importance only in
these terms and cannot be viewed as a process wrought outside
of me and of my world.

To Bultmann, this does not mean that

it is a mythical event, but an existential-historical
(geschichtlioh) one which originated in an objeot1ve-h1stor1cal
(historisoh) event.

But it becomes redemptive only as I

appropriate its significance for myself.
l

l

I

I
l

Bultmann is right

in asserting that the Oross of Ohr1st cannot be understood
outside of faith, but the question is whether it is significant that the Cross of Christ was also the Oross of Jesus
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as a figure in past history.

He admits that the early

preachers looked at it this way, but then they had lived
with him and it was an experience in their own lives.

For us,

as an event of the past, the Cross cannot disclose its own
meaning.

But, we must ask, did not the first preachers see

the cross and come to understand its significance after the
resurrection and in light of the resurrection, just as we
do?

And did not the cross in some way become significant

because it was the oross of Jesus and not someone else?

The

cross must be seen as both historisch and gesohichtlich and
as,.significant not only because it became the latter, but
precisely because it was and is both.
The .subordination of the objective-historical becomes
particularly acute with reference to the resurrection.
Wilder accuses him of seeing the resurrection as something
which happened only between God and the disciples rather than
between God and Jesus Christ:

it must be seen as a real

event, apart from the Cross, and it must be viewed as the
mighty act of God in Ohrist.10

Bultmann's dismissal of the

resurrection as a mythical event is an arbitrary decision on
his pa.rt based on his pnor assumption·::that anything miraculous in character must be eliminated as being historisch.
Such an assumption sounds far more like the influence of
liberal modernism that existentialism.

The miracle of the

Resurrection was an event in past history witnessed to by a
select f'ew and by the Gospel wr1 ters.

He who was resurrec.ted

10Amos Wilder, "Mythology in the New Testament,"
Journal .Q!. Biblical Literature, Vol. 69, p. 121.
.
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was the same Jesus Christ who was crucified.

His appropriate

body was both within time and space and beyond time and space
and they both knew him and did not know him.

These witnesses

cannot be dismissed as foolish visionaries and the faith of
the early Church, which the writers recorded with integrity
cannot be counted as naive.

Every geschichtlich event must

be based on an historisch fact.

Bultmann's statement that

the resurrection rests on the objective-historical event of
the cross and is a witness to the fact that this was the
Cross of Christ seems to be escapism and a bit absurd.

The

resurrection must be seen as an objective-historical event
in its own right.

It is interesting to observe that the

kerygma for Bultmann does declare that it is this One and
this One only who is preached.

That is the basic offense.

Does it really become any greater with the acceptance of the
Resurrection?
It is this basic failure to unite the Jesus of Nazareth
with the Christ of faith that brings BUltmann most of his
troubles.

His concept of the development of Ohristology

within the early Church contributes substantially to this
failure, but it primarily rests on his emphasis on the unimportance of historisch for faith.
review of Kerygma

~Myth,

Amos N. Wilder, in his

commented:

What is peculiar and surprising is that Bultmann
puts historical research out of count in what
concerns our grasp of the real significance of
these matters. Only faith is operative here on the basis of direct revelation of the Word.
He thinks, indeed, of revelation as operating
in isolation from historical contingencies
and relativities - save that, of course, it
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began with an historical event and that our
own faith is conditioned by our individual
historical setting. The Word reaches us. as
it were, by a kind of high-tension trolley
across the centuries and strikes its saving
spark in us. But the origin of its must not
be placed at the mercy of historical investigation .11
Closely akin to the matter of relating h1stor1sch to
seschichtlich is that of relating eschatology to the life of
man-in-the-world.

Even if one accepts the view that history

must be essentially seen as existing in the present, the
fact remains that any given moment ~ be historical, but
only

ma~

be eschatological.

In the eschatological moment

in which time, past and future, is telescoped into "now"
and man achieves authentic existence, man is nonetheless involved in the world of objective facts.

In the best of

existentialist terms, he is still enmeshed in the toils of
decisions and problems and though open to possibilities (as
Heidegger puts it), still limited by his earthly existence
and unreleased from the course of objective happenings&
Bultmann's emphasis on the eschatological seems to
give little value to life as it is lived in time and space.
Butterfield has wisely observed that
It has always been realised in the main tradition
of Christianity that if the Word was made flesh
matter can never be regarded as evil in itself.
In a similar way, if 011e moment of time could
hold so much as this, then you cannot brush time
away and say that any moment of it is mere vanity.I 2
11illQ.~. p. 12 6 •

York:

12 Herbert Butterfield, Christianity and History {New
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950), p. 121.
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In all fairness to Bultmann, he does say that in the eschatological moment when man becomes authentic being, he becomes
free to obey.
The Pauline catalogue of the fruits of the Spirit
('love, joy, peace, long-suffering, kindness,
goodness, faithfulness, temperance', Gal. 5:22)
shows how faith, by detaching man from the world,
makes him capable of fellowship in the community.
Now that he is delivered from anxiety and from
the frustration which comes from clinging to
the tangible realities of the visible world,
man 1s free to enjoy fellowship with others ••
• • And this means being a new creature.13
The ambiguity arises in his view of esohatolog1oal existence
as being complete detachment from the world, by which he
claims to mean, not asceticism, but dealing with the world
in a spirit of

11

as if not. 11

From an existentialist anthro-

pology, this presents real problems and man's relationship
with the world becomes quite vague.

If we coUld find evi-

dence in his writing to avow a definite belief in an eschatological existence beyond death, this question of man's
relationship to the world would be less of a problem perhaps.
But he has little to say specifically about this.

He does,

however, deny the actuality of the Resurrection except in
the proclaimed Word and he does apparently equate "lostness"

.

.

with inauthentic existence and "saved" with authentic existence
in the here and now.

If he is to hold to a concept of realized

eschatology, then he must deal more seriously with man's
relationship with the world.

On the other hand, if he holds

to his existentialist anthropology and his understanding of
13

Bultmann et al, Kerygma ~ ~ • • • , p. 22.
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redemption and faith, I'm not sure that the problem can be
overcome.

What this does to the historical deposit of the

Church down through the years and to the witness of this or
that Christian as he lived yesterday is another question.
Apparently, however, it makes it rather unimportant.
In considering Niebuhr's treatment of Christianity and
history, the first question that comes to mind centers in the
ambiguity of his Ohristology.

In some of his earlier writings

he makes frequent references to the "religion of Jesus" and ·
to the "ethics of Jesus" and in his first book went so far
as to state
If there is any lack of identity between the Jesus
of history and the Christ of religious experience,
the Jesus of history is nevertheless more capable
of giving historical reality to the necessa~y
Obrist idea than any character of history.14
In later writings he seems to have changed in this respect,
but his thought concerning the nature of the person of
Jesus Christ is still quite ambiguous.

On several occasions

he treats the orthodox statement that Jesus was both divine
and human as a mythological one.

He does not, however, with

his emphasis on the Christ of faith, fall into the error to
which Bultmann succumbs, that of making the historical Jesus
vague and unimportant.
E. J. Oarnell has been extremely critical of Niebuhr
in his treatment of the Jesus of history and accuses Niebuhr
of making Christ the abstract wisdom of history and Jesus of
1 4n.e1nhold Niebuhr, Does Civilization Need Religion?
p. 235, cited by Paul Lehmami;-11 The Ohristology of Reinhold:
Niebuhr," Reinhold Niebuhr: !!1Jl.Religious • • • , ed. by
Kegley and Bretall, p. 260.
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history as inconsequentially related to his system.

He goes

even fUrther in his criticism by saying that, since Niebuhr
states that where there is history1here is freedom and where
there is freedom there is sin, Jesus was finite and a sinner
and is judged himself by the 0~1st. 1 5

This is going a little

far, it seems, as Niebuhr is conscientious, even if vague,
about attempting to hold the fUll human reality of Jesus to
the person and work of Christ.

The criticism, however, seems

just in light of Niebuhr's claim that sin is inevitable but
not necessary.

Actually, Niebuhr has not treated the sub-

ject of Ohristology explicitly.

It would be well if he

would spell out his thoughts a little more precisely.
We might, at this point, say a word about Niebuhr's
treatment of the resurrection of Christ.

While it is much

more satisfactory than Bultmann's complete dismissal of the
resurrection as non-historical and his insistence that 1t be
seen only as existing within the preaching of the Word,
Niebuhr's conclusions leave something to be desired.

We

greatly appreciate his emphasis on the revelatory depth of
the fact of the resurrection, but cannot agree that the
Biblical accounts are mere "efforts to certify this triumph

.

through specific historical details fjihicif may well be regarded as an expression of a scepticism which runs through
the whole history of Christianity~nl6

The miracle of the

15Edward John Carnell, ~ Theology Q.! Reinhold Niebuhr
(Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company,
1960), rev. ed., p. 144.
16N1ebuhr, Faith ~ Histor1, p. 148.
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resurrection is imbedded in the historical process and must
be seen as something more than an awareness on the part of
the disciples.

His proposition that the recognition of the

triumph of God's sovereignty was the miracle of belief is
very much appreciated, but that cannot be all.

There must

be an historical event behind that fact.
Fortunately, Niebuhr does not deal with historisch
and geschichtlich, but he does have some problems in relating
what he calls ubeyond history 0 to the historical process.
("Beyond history" appears to mean something beyond time and
space and all the phenomena of1hi.s world, yet it also is
the source of meaning for history.
humorously calls for the

11

D. D. Williams rather

meaning of .me~1ng 11 at this point.17)

It must be recognized; and appreciated, that Niebuhr goes to
great lengths to keep man within the historical process and
related to it.

But he runs into trouble when he stresses

that meaning must come from beyond history.

Nature, history,

and beyond history seem rather unrelated a great deal of the
time.
This becomes particularly acute when man is seen in
relation to God.

Niebuhr is ambiguous in his discussion of

the relation of God's redemptive work to history.

In Faith

i':n.9:, History, he makes the statement that "from the first

.

covenant of God to the resurrection, God's revelations to a
people are 1mbedded in history" and later he states that "the
climax of the crucifixion and resurrection thus become not
l7naniel D. Williams, ttNiebUhr and Liberalism," Reinhold Niebuh~: !!_is Religious •.•• , ed. by Kegley and Era:tell,
pp. 207-8.

/
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merely the culmination of the whole series of revelations
but the pattern of all subsequent confrontations between God
and man."18

At this point there are four questions which we

would like to ask Niebuhr.

(1) If the Christian revelation

occurred in history, it seems to follow that it must be connected with preceding and subsequent history and that it
must function as a power within history.

If there is hope

beyond this realm of history, then must not there also be
hope within this realm?

(2) If the God-man relationship is

seen to be one of I-Thou, does this occur in complete transcendance or does it not occur within this realm of history?
(3) In Christ, something happened in history and the new

age began.

In man's response of faith and repentance, some-

thing happens:m history and while in one sense he does live
in the interim before the fUlfillment of history, is it not
also true that in another sense he participates in that fulfillment now?

(4) In redemption all of the evil and injustice

of life are surely not removed, but if it is relevant for man,
as Niebuhr would surely insist, then should it not be said
that God's redemptive work occurs within history and not
beyond it?
We are not suggesting that Niebuhr errs by an emphasis
on the beyond that negates this realm.

On the contrary, his

emphasis is always on man in the historical process.

But he

does insist that the meaning of this process is only available
18

Niebuhr,

Faith~

History, pp. 148-49.
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beyond the process.

What we are asking is that he make more

clear his understanding of the relationship of the two.
A part of this same issue, obviously, is the question
concerning the source of ethical norms which are to be applied
to history.

Niebuhr attempts to emancipate himself from

pure relativism by clinging to the Christian perspective, but
his revolt against legalism and absolutisms fails to see this
through with much success.

At some points he seems to say

that there exists a moral law which is God's commandment,
while at others he seems to imply that no moral law can be
known or made applicable within history.

One cannot but

appreciate his emphasis on the law of love as the impossible
possibility, yet one wonders if this does not agree with
some kind of universal ethic which, though coming from beyond
history, imposes its meaning upon history, judging it as well

as bringing it to redemption.

We are back to the question

of this relationship between history and beyond history.
Robert E. Fitch has been quite critical of Niebuhr at this
point and observes that

the principles of nature and the principles of
history are not so radically divorced as Niebuhr
insists. Such a law L.i'hat is, one wbioh would
see these two as inter-relate£9' would allow for
flexibility as well as for precision, would
combine the positive element of love with the
negative element of judgment, would readily
embrace the multifarious polarities and ironies
of life, and behind the competing but still
cooperating impulses toward the creative and
the discreative in man, would yet point to the
Christian revelation !.!!. history as the token
of a God who, under the conditions of human

/
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freedom and finitude, is still both absolutely
and empirically the Lord of that history.19
For Niebuhr, what is the source of the ethical norms, if there
are any, and what is the relation of nature, history, and
beyond history?

Always stressing the world of nature and of

human history, he escapes any kind of "other-worldly" solu-

tions that might suggest gold streets and pearly gates, yet
he remains extremely vague at this point of meaning, principles, and norms.
In this final section of this thesis, we have attempted
to evaluate the strengths and the weaknesses of the concept of
history in the thought of these two men and to point out where
they are similar

and

where they are different.

We have not

attempted to say where one is right and the other wrong, nor
to set our own thought up as the ultimate truth.
Appreciation must be expressed to both Bultmann and
Niebuhr for their worthy attempts to speak to the contemporary
situation and to make the Ohristian Gospel intelligible to

modern man.

Some of their errors may be best understood

when placed over against the thoughts of such various antagonists as liberalism, orthodoxy, and progressivism.

In reply

to these, one man goes off in one direction while the other
seems to go off in another.
Bultmann finds meaning within the existentialist
philosophy and this provides the basis for his ideas of history.
Within this framework and with these presuppositions, he builds
19

Fitch, .Q.ll•

it '
£..._.

pp. 306- 8 •

(.
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his ''system, 0 if he will please forgive the term, and develops
his emphasis on the eschatological dimension of history and
his emphasis upon the individual and his encounter with God.
Because he begins from an existentialist anthropology, his
thought forms are quite different from Niebuhr's and any
particular conclusions, therefore, extremely difficult to
actually compare.
It must be said that Niebuhr does a better job of
criticizing other theories than he does of constructing a
satisfactory alternative.

Yet because he has rightly sensed,

as Hoffman points out, that "contemporary society can conceive
of no goal which would give it direction and meaning, that
history seems to have lost all significance, 11 20

he has at-

tempted to give insights that would help people see a sense
of meaningfulness in the whole of history, not just in the
present as Bultmann does, and see the movement toward the
end as filled with purpose.
As he develops his concept of history, however, he
keeps in balance the mutually serving roles of society

and

the individual, in contrast to Bultmann's rather strict
individualism, and he places his primary emphasis on human
history as it is lived in this world.

Actually, it would be

helpful if Bultmann had a little more of Niebuhr's emphasis
on this world and if Niebuhr had a little more of Bultmann's
eschatology.

Bultmann would do well to try to rectify his

thought to give history the meaning and significance which
20

Hoffman, .Q:Q.• £.ll., p. 84.
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it warrants and has.

If one must decide, it would be our con-

clusion that one would be better off to err with Niebuhr who,
at least, does not negate human history.

Both, however, need

a little of the other.

I
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